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A FEW THOUGHTS ON Tim USE OF Tim CONSUMERS PRICE INDEX TO
ADJUST CONSTITUTIONAL SALARY LIITS.
The last temptation is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for
the wrong reason. T. S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral
On June 22, 1962, the Kentucky Court of Appeals m Matthews
v. Allen' relaxed the constitutional limits on the salaries of public
officials. The controversy centers around the use of the Consumers
Price Index2 to adjust the dollar figures in section 2463 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution prescribing limits on salaries of of public officials.
Attorney General Breckmndge agreed that the specific holding of
Allen should be sustained on narrow grounds, but denied that the
Consumers Price Index should be used to adjust the figures in sec-
tion 246.4 The Court of Appeals observed that the Consumers Price
Index at the time of the decision was 1.289 times its 1949 level. There-
fore, it takes a dollar bill, a quarter and four pennies to buy in 1962
what a dollar bill alone would have bought in 1949. Because the
present form of section 246 became effective in 1949, the court ad-
lusted the salary limit applicable to circuit judges to $10,827.60, 5
i.e., $8,400 x 1.289.
This holding invites comment in four areas: first, the court's reason-
ing; second, the political and economic history of section 246 and
possible motives for the Allen decision; third, the validity and prac-
LL.B., Yale University. Member, Kentucky Bar.
I The opinion was originally released, though not for publication, on June
22, 1962. A petition for rehearing by Attorney General John Breckenndge, on
grounds that the opinion went too far and took up matters not in issue, was
denied and the final opinion, as modified, released on October 5, 1962. 360
S.W.2d 135 (1962). For the newspaper account of the Attorney General's peti-
tion. see Louisville Couner Jouinal, July 26, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
"Note 34 infra.
' No public officer shall receive as compensation per annum for
official services any amount in excess of the following sums: of-
ficers whose iunsdiction or duties are coextensive with the Common-
wealth and judges and commissioners of the Court of Appeals,
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12.000); Circuit Judges. Eight Thousand
Four Hundred Dollars ($8.400)- and all other public officers, Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200). Ky. Const., §246 (1949).
4 Note 1, supra.
NMatthews v. Allen, 260 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Ky. 1962).
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ticability of employing the Consumers Price Index, and fourth, the
significance and applicability of the Allen decision to all salary lim-
itations and to other areas of public concern.
Matthews v. Allen tests the constitutionality of House Bill 65.8
House Bill 65 gives circuit judges new duties "coexistensive with the
Commonwealth," and provides additional compensation which raises
their salaries above the 8,400 dollar limit of section 246. Authority
supports the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court and of the Court
of Appeals that the salary increase is constitutional. The new state-
wide duties of circuit judges makes inapplicable section 2S5,7 which
prohibits a salary increase during a term of office.8 The new duties
also make applicable the 12,000 dollar limit of section 246 rather
than the 8,400 dollar limit because the duties "are coextensive with the
Commonwealth."9 Judge Bird wrote a concurring opinion that up-
holds the constitutionality of House Bill 65 on the narrow ground
that "each regular circuit judge is to hold two separate and distinct
offices." This reasoning is substantially similar as that used by Judge
Prewitt in the Franklin Circuit Court and that sought by Attorney
General Breckenridge.
Discarding these grounds, Judge Millikens opinion states:
Candor compels the questions: Is this sort of approach necessary in
order to afford circuit judges an adequate salary under the Con-
stitution? Is the salary limitation provision (of Section 246) of our
State Constitution a mere lifeless mathematical formula?io
At this point in his decision, Judge Milliken abandoned discussion
of the new, statewide duties of circuit judges, a point that would
have disposed of the case. He turned his attention to section 133 of
the Kentucky Constitution, which authorizes the General Assembly
to pay circuit judges an "adequate salary "" Judge Milliken reasons
that the authorization of "adequate compensation,' found in section
133, conflicts with the 8,400 dollar limit on the salary of circuit judges
found in section 2461' (that 8,400 dollars per year is not adequate
6 H.B. 65, Ky. 1962.
7 The salaries of public officers shall not be changed during the terms for
winch they were elected; but it shall be the duty of the General As-
sembhlv to regulate, by a general law, in what cases and what deduc
tions shall be made for neglect of official duties. Ky Const.. §2:35.
8 Barker v. Barnes, 246 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1952); Coleman v. Hurst. 226 Kv.
501, 118 S.W.2d 133 (1928); James v. Cammack, 139 Ky. 233, 129 S.W 582
(1910). These cases are cited in Matthews v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d at 136.
SIbid.
10 Matthews v. Allen, 860 S.W.2d at 137.
1i The judges of the Circuit Court shall, at stated times, receive for their
serxices an adequate compensation to he fixed by law, whieh shill be
equal and uniform throughout the State. Kv. Const.. §133.12 Ky. Const., §246.
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is his inarticulate major premise),13 The opinon constituted that it
would be better to attempt to harmonize the two sections than to
hold that one overruled the other, and stated that "the sections can
be truthfully harmonized only through equating dollars with what
they will do in the market place."14 By failing to hold constitutional
House Bill 65 on the grounds of the judges new duties, the decision
in Allen violates the long accepted principle that a court will not
unnecessarily decide a constitutional issue.is
The first fallacy in Judge Millikens reasoning is that the court
cites no proof of the inadequacy of present salaries. Prices have
risen, but the court showed that no fewer candidates seek judge-
ships. No proof was offered to demonstrate that qualifications of those
who do run for judge are lower than they should be.16 As Judge
Milliken commented, salaries of public officials have never been
based on quantum meruit.17 Pursuit of wealth alone does not moti-
vate public service. Prestige, power and rectitude are also important
values, and it might be argued that a multi-value motivation provides
better judges than pursuit of wealth alone. The court's further observa-
tion that taxes today take a large bite out of judges salaries ignores
the fact that these taxes apply to everyone.
Even if sections 133 and 246 conflict, by accepted principles of
constitutional interpretation the specific dollar amounts of section
246 should control the general language of section 183.i8 However,
is The famous dictum of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), is appropriately recalled:
General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major prermse.
One very interesting treatment of the impact of judicial subjectivity is Clark
& Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Com-
mon Law Tradition, 71 Yale L.J. 239 (1962). judge Charles E. Clark and
David Trubek comment at length on Llewellyn s book, The Common Law
Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), and conclude that Llewellyn does not
give sufficient deference to the subjectivity of judges.
14 Matthews v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d at 137
15 Sparks v. Hart Coal Co., 74 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1935); Preston v.
Clements, 313 Ky 479. 232 S.W.2d 85 (1950); Martin v. J. Bacon & Sons,
268 Ky. 612, 105 S.W.2d 569 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 642 (1938);
Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Kv. 112, 75 S.W.2d 839 (1928).
16 Empincal detenninatioi of whether current salary limits affect the
quality of the judiciary is feasible. How many candidates choose to run for
the office of county circuit or Court of Appeals judge can be counted. Educa-
tional and legal expenence of candidates can be ascertained. These records
can be compared with records of previous years, and with similar data from
other states. The task is not Herculean. The court may expect aid from the
advocates, its clerks, and perhaps could suggest that the Legislative Research
Commission study the problem.
17 Matthews v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d at 137.
i8Whittenberg v. Louisville, 238 Ky. 117, 36 S.W.2d 853 (1931); Bit-
tizer & Wiley v. State Highway Commr., 203 Ky. 15, 261 S.W 855 (1924);
Cnck v. Rash, 190 Ky. 820, 229 S.W 63 (1921).
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stare decisis provides no more than broad propositions in a case as
unique as Allen. Recitation of the facts in cases enunciating the rule
that specific provisions control general provisions is less helpful than
an understanding of that rule. The rule rests on the idea that nothing
demonstrates the meaning of a general principle so well as a specific
application. Section 246 exemplifies the range of salaries that section
138 contemplates to be adequate. Cases in which general provisions
prevail over specific provisions involve facts in which application of
a specific provision would defeat a well-established general prin-
ciple 9 In these cases, there is usually a high degree of agreement
that those responsible for the conflicting propositions intended for the
general proposition to prevail. 20
History of section 246 does not support the proposition that it was
intended to be subordinated to section 133. Those who voted for sec-
tion 246 were fully exposed to the effects of price level changes. When
the Constitutional Convention of 1891 met, the struggle between "hard
money7".and "soft money" forces was the nations biggest political
question. The Bland-Allison Act, passed in 1878, was repealed in
1890,21 and in 1896, William Jennings Bryan tiraded that labor was
being crucified on a "cross of gold." After every major war, the United
States has experienced inflation.22 By 1949, when the voters of Ken-
tucky amended section 246, the Consumers Price Index had risen
seventy-six per cent from its September 1939 level.23 Moreover, tech-
niques of tying prices and wages to price level indexes had been de-
veloped by industry and labor, and were available to the draftsmen of
the 1949 amendment. 24
Most of those who went to the polls on November 8, 1949, prob-
19 Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 117 S.W.2d 918,
920 (Ky. 1938).
The courts will not give a technical interpretation, but will regard
the language employed in the Constitution as that ordinarily under-
stood by the generality of the people and though, as has been
frequently said, a Constitution is not static, if its adaption to a given
act of the legIslature is destructive of its specific pnnciples, or is
clearly opposed to its particular requirements or restrctions, such
accommo aton cannot be recogized.2 0 Runyon v. Smith, 308 Ky. 73, 212 S.W.2d 521 (1945); City of Lex-
ington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96, 61 S.W.2d 1092 (1934).
Between 1878 and 1890, when the law was repealed, the treasury
urchased $308 million of silver against which it created $378 mil-
.on of currency, netting about $70 million senoirage on its operation.
Klise, Money and Banking 76 (1955).
22 Chandler, Inflation in the United States 1 (1951).
23 Ind.
24 Cost of living data was used by the U. S. Anthracite Coal Strike Com-
mission as early as 1902. Bv the 1940's, unions requested clauses in collective
bargaining agreements that determined wages by referring to the Con-
sumers Pnce Index. Wilson, Collective Bargaining Pnncipals and Practices
(1952). See generally id. 262-71.
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ably had no intent one way or the other on the purchasing power.
The 1949 amendment to section 246 cannot be interpreted as a price
level adjustment of the 1891 limitation of 5,000 dollars. Purchasing
power of 5,000 1891 dollars is approximately that of 19,950 1949
dollars.24a In other words, if the knowledge of price level adjust-
ment can be imputed to the 1949 voters, they actually reduced the
salary limitations!24b Short of better proof that the voters "intended"
for salaries to be adjusted by the use of price levels, the Court of
Appeals should not subordinate the plain meaning of the word "dol-
lars" in section 246 to the fancied intent of voters who were never
asked. The only authority cited by the court to support its invocation
of price level indexes is J. C. Penny Co. v. Livingston25 and the Gold
Clause cases.2 6 The Penny case refused to set aside a jury verdict as
excessive, and stands for nothing more than judicial recognition that
prices change. The Gold Clause cases enunciate a principle of learn-
ing to live with price level changes, and are further evidence that
those who passed the 1949 amendment did not naively assume that
prices remain constant.
Reluctance of Kentucky voters to raise salary limits might account
for the Allen decision. Four times prior to 1949, attempts to amend
the 1891 limit of 5,000 dollars failed emphatically 27 Not until Friday
after the Tuesday election could it be ascertained that the 1949 amend-
ment to section 246 carried. It passed by only 6,569 votes, and it failed
by 25,366 votes to carry the First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Dis-
tricts.28 Extra light might be cast on the Allen decision by consider-
ing that the court abandoned the reasoning that the circuit judges
new duties are "coextensive with the Commonwealth."2 9 This narrow
reasoning could not effect the 12,000 dollar limit of the salaries of
the judges of the Court of Appeals and other officials with state-
240 Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumers Price Index is
not available for the full penod of 1891-1949, a good apprommation of price-
level changes dunng these years can be made. Fisher & Cohrssen, Stable Money
5 (19"4)" see Chandler, op. cit. supra note 22.
"41'Appellees brief quotes Mr. Pettit as stating to the 1891 Constitutional
Convention:
[Kentuckv] is not niggardly, not penurious, nor will she ever be. Her
laborers are "'worthy of their hire," and she always rewards them."
Considering that a 5.000 dollar salary limit in 1891 is eqivalent to about
25,700 dollars in 1961, and about 15,950 dollars in 1949, Mr. Pettit's statement
proves only that sometime between 1891 and 1949 Kentucky s willingness to
pav large salaries to her public officials decreased; or, more likely, that it
wns easier to slip something through in a package deal like the 1891 Consti-
tution than to have the voters focus on it as they did the 1949 amendment.
2271 S.W.2d 106 (Ky 1954).
2629-1 U.S. 240 (1935).
2" Louisville Conier journal, Nov. 9, 1949, p. 1, col. 6.
2S Louisville Councr journal, Nov. 11, 1949, p. 1, col. 1.
-9 Cases cited note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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wide jobs, whereas the Allen opinion raises these limits to $15,468.00,3
t.e., $12,000 x 1.289.
Even if the spectre of continued inflation makes the dollar limits
of section 246 inimical to section 133, use of the Consumers Price
Index for other than evidence of inflation is regrettable. Judge Milli-
ken's opinion abounds with phrases that constitutional provisions are
"living and not dead," "concerned with substance and not form,"
and "more generic and more organic than ordinary law;" but it fails to
emphasize that a court's interpretation must be capable of feasible
application. The Consumers Price Index changes monthly It goes
down as well as up.31 Do salary limits change from month to month?
Do salary limits decline when the Consumers Price Index declines?
These questions at least invite more litigation. The use of yearly
averages would eliminate the objection that monthly changes are too
difficult to admimster, but the Court of Appeals is in no position to
suggest this. Whether monthly, semi-annual, annual or bi-annual ad-
justments are made is a question of salary policy beyond the Court
of Appeal's capacity as a reviewing body 32 If the price level falls,
once the constitutional salary limits are raised, the strong principle
that judicial independence requires no salary decreases invites liti-
gation as to whether limits can be lowered with the decline of the
Consumers Price Index.33 The immutability of judges salaries, more-
0 It rmght be noted in passing that Kentucky judges are particularly
litigious when their salaries are concerned. Nine and one-half pages are re-
qured to list sentence annotations and citations of Kentucky decisions con-
cermng judges salaries in West's Kentucky Digest, Judges §22 (1962).
The federal judge for the Western District of Kentucky litigated Evans
v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which held that the federal iccme tax did not
apply to the salaries of federal judges who took office before passage of the tax law.
31 Observing the behavior of the Consumers Price Index dunng a recent
year illustrates this point. (1958-59 =100)
April, 1961 ............................ 108.9 Oct ........................................... 104.6
M ay .......................................... 103.9 N ov ........................................... 104.6
June ........................................ 104.0 D ec . ........................................ 104.5
July .......................................... 104.4 Jan., 1962 ................................ 104.5August .................................... 104.3 Feb . .......................................... 104.8
August................104.3.Feb. .................. 104.0Sept ...................................... 104.6 March. ................. 105.0
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, v. 85, no. 6, at 727
(June 1962).
S Cf. Rodell, Nine Men 11 (1955).
In a sense, it is inevitable that the [Supreme] Court, if it be ainvthing,
should be a brake on the rest of our machinery of government. By the
very nature of the way it works, the Court, for all the power its mem-
bers hold, is only a negative-never an affirmative force. It cannot create.
it cannot initiate, it cannot put into action any governmental pFilicv of
any kind all the justice can do is to say Yes or No to a policy or to
a program or a part of a policy or program that has been started by
someone else in some other branch of the government.
33 Kentucky courts have often had to interpret various constitutional provi-
(Continued on next page)
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over, perhaps motivates lawyers to abandon the uncertainty of pri-
vate practice to pursue a judgeship; yet it is this very immutability
that Allen directly attacks.
The Consumers Price Index cannot accurately measure purchasing
power changes.3 4 Although one might be surprised at the uniformity
with which the prices of different items in different parts of the coun-
try move,3 5 a general price index measures only average price changes.
The index does not reflect changes m the quality of goods. Unless a
continuing improvement of living standards is assumed, the concept
of purchasing power" must refer to consumer utility. The price of a
1949 automobile might be less than that of a 1962 automobile, but
the latter is a different car designed to fulfill 1962 desires.3 6 Tail-fins,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
sions prohibiting a change in the salaries of public officials while in office. One
such provision is section 235, note 7 supra. When salaries are increased, the
courts have interpreted the provisions liberally. Barrett v. City of Falmouth,
109 Ky. 151, 58 S.W 520 (1900); Stone v. Pryor, 103 Ky. 645, 45 S.W 1053
(1898). When salanes have been decreased, however, the courts construed the
provisions strictly. City of Olive Hill v. Craig, 267 Ky. 135 (1928); Adams v.
Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S.W.2d 836 (1928); Grayson County v. Rodgers, 122
S.W 866 (Ky. 1909); Butler County v. James, 116 Ky. 575, 76 S.W 402 (1903);
cf. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), discussed in note 30 supra.
34 Construction of the Consumers Price Index is explained in U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Techniques of Preparing Ma]or Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Bull. No. H68 (1954).
35 If the pnce levels of the various components of the Consumers Price Index
are compared for the period of 1949-1961, it is seen that only the price of med-
ical services rose substantially faster than prices of other components.
(1947-49 = 100)
Trans- Medical Other
Year All Items Food Houstng Apparel portation Care Sermces
1949 95.5 95.9 95.0 97.1 90.6 94.9 91.1
1955 114.5 110.9 120.0 103.7 126.4 128.0 120.2
1961 132.4 126.4 128.0 126.7 125.9 137.1 128.9
The Consumers Price Index applied to all items vanes little across the country.








New York 103.9 104.8
Philadelphia 103.2 104.4
Pittsburg 104.1 105.1
St. Louis 102.4 103.9
Seattle 103.3 104.9
Washington, D. C. 102.2 103.7
All statistics are found in the January issue of U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Monthly Labor Review, following the year for which statistics are given.
36 The economic universe is not made up of hats, autos and spinach. It is
made up of felt hats, straw hats, dress hats, sports hats, blue hats,
black hats, aeroplane helmets, nmghtcaps, and on the edge, triangular
scarves; and Plunouths, Fords, Chevrolets, roadsters, coupes, and con-
(Continued on next page)
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wrap-around windshields and lengths that create parking problems are
perhaps impracticalities that supply the consumers psychic needs for
reasons observed by Thorstem Veblen and Vance Packard. Also, the
utility of the 1962 car is influenced, inter alia, by the construction of
better roads, and changed prices of gasoline and service in 1962.
To prove the obsolescence of the 1949 amendment, the Con-
sumers Price Index is superb evidence. To fix salary limits by it is
objectionable on both theoretical and practical grounds. If the Court
of Appeals does discover evidence that judges salaries are inadequate
and therefore that sections 133 and 246 conflict, it would be better
to rule that section 246 is inoperative and to instruct the General
Assembly to pay what salaries it considers "adequate." Electoral pres-
sures on legislators and potential revival of section 246 should pre-
vent plunder of the Commonwealths treasury 3 t
Application of the Allen rule, if it prevails, will probably be con-
fined to the salary limits in section 246. Section 112 provides that
judges of the Court of Appeals are to receive "adequate compensa-
tion," 8 and is therefore completely analagous ta section 133. The
Allen rule need be extended little for the court to hck that implied
m the creation of every office is the power of the General Assembly
to pay "adequate compensation." If this inference is made, price level
changes can be applied to all salary limitations. However, differences
in the nature of the cases will probably prevent- application of the
Allen rule to dollar amounts such as those that distinguish between
grand and petit larceny and that prescribe jurisdictional limits.
More significant than anything the Court of Appeals may do would
be the consequences of all governmental decision-makers recogmz-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
vertbiles; and plain spinach, fancy spinach, spinach in cans, and Birds
Eye Frozen Spinach. Norns, .The Theory of Consumers Demand 77
(1941).
Those interested in pursuing further the problem of accounting for quality
differences in pnce level indexes may start by reading Hofsten, Pnce Indexes and
Quality Changes (1952). The hook also contains a good hibliographv.
37 Section 246, as adopted in 1891, seems to have been directed at the abuses
of certain public officials in Louisville. Debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion 4197-98, 4374.
Even then, the problem of the section s rigidity and lack of need for it
was debated, although existence of this debate indicates that the provision was
recognized as being intended to be as rigid as it sounds.
MR. WASHINGTON: It occurs to me that the greater light shed on
this subject, the more obviously it becomes our duty to say 'hands
off.' This is the rankest kind of legislation. It is a matter which
should be left entirely to the people of the state. Will wisdom
die when this convention adjourns, if it ever does adjourn? Is there
no gray matter, no patriotism in Kentucky except what is to be found
in this hall? Debates of the Constitutional Convention 4229.
38 "They [Judges of the Court of Appeals] shall at stated times receive for
for their services an adequate compensation to be fixed by law." Ky. Const., §112.
1962]
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ing the impact of a changing price level. This comment does not
undertake even to list all areas of public interest affected by inflation.
A partial list includes income tax laws, rate-fixing by commissioners,
accounting practice, 9 labor law, social security payments, and duties
of fiduciaries.
Professor Ralph C. Jones of Yale s Economics Department studied
the effects of changing prices on four firms.40 He concludes that
reported income is often less than income adjusted for price level
changes.41 Insufficient depreciation charges creates a major distor-
tion of income reported in historical dollars.42 For example, assume
a firm charges as depreciation 10,000 dollars yearly in hopes of de-
preciating evenly over ten years the cost of a 100,000 dollar building.
If the price level nses, the firm charges too little against current in-
come. If it falls, the firm charges too much.
U S. Steel has experienced difficulty in modernizing its facilities,
and contends that current depreciation policies are inadequate.4 3 Its
recent attempt to raise prices of steel was based on this inability to
pay for new facilities.44 Although rebuking U. S. Steers attempt to
raise prices, President Kennedy has proposed tax relief via more lib-
eral depreciation policies.45 Professor Jones observes that changes in
utility rates lag behind price level changes. He documented that the
New York Telephone Company had to borrow money when the
39 The Amencan Accounting Association has undertaken a study of this
problem and has published several books in a series entitled: Price Level Changes
and Financial Statements. Substantial aid for this program was supplied from
grants by the Merrill Foundation for the Advancement of Financial Knowledge.
40Jones, Case Studies of Four Firms (1955). Companies studied are New
York Telephone Co., Armstrong Cork Co., The Reece Corp., and Sargent & Co.
41 Id. at 22, 23, 69, 70, 113, 114, 152.
42 Jones, Effects of Price Level Changes on Business Income, Capital and
Taxes 45 (1946). See generally id. chs. iv-vi.
43 In 1947, U. S. Steel reported depreciation for the previous year on the
basis of replacement costs. Their accountants would not certify the financial
statements: the Securities and Exchange Commission rejected the statements,
and in 1948 U. S. Steel resumed its previous accounting procedure. An inter-
esting account of tlus dispute with complete documentation is found in Anthony.
Managenal Accounting 222-231 (1960).
44 Leslie B. Worthington, President of U S. Steel, made these statements,
among others: In the three years since the end of 1958, United States Steel has
spent $1.185,000.000 for modermization and replacement of facili-
ties and for the development of new sources of raw materials.
Depreciation in these years amounted to $610,000,000.
Only by generating the funds necessary to keep these facilities
fully competitive can our compamy continue to provide its cus-
tomers with a dependable source of steel and to provide its employees
with dependable jobs. New York Times, April 11. 1962, p. 28 , cols.1.2 &4.
45 "The President has proposed to Congress a tax incentive for business
modernization. It woAild give a special tax reduction to companies-and stores,
and farms, and theatets-that install new equpment and machinery." New York
Times, April 15, 1962, §4, p. ES, col. 8.
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price level was high and retire debt when the price level was low. 46
Unions place cost-of-living clauses in wage contracts, but to date
there is no record of a firm s offering financial statements adjusted for
prive level changes to prove that it could not meet a union s demands.4 7
Portfolios managed by corporate trustees must contain a substantial
portion of common stocks if the purchasing power of the corpus is to
be preserved during a period of inflation.48
It is hoped that the proper decision-makers recognize and act
effectively in these and other areas of public interest affected by price
level changes. If the Allen decision calls attention to the problems
created by rising prices, and these problems are effectively met, lead-
ership of the Court of Appeals will be affirmed.
46Jones, Case Studies of Four companies 38 (1955).
4 7 An employer, while bargaining collectively with a union, must support
by his financial statements the contention that he cannot afford to meet the union s
demands for higher wages. N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U. S. 149 (1955).
48 What securities a trustee may purchase with the funds of the trust he
holds vanes among the states and is sometimes controlled by statute. 54 Am.
Jur. Trusts §§380-81 (1945). Rising pnces reduce the purchamng power repre-
sented by the face amount of a bond, whereas the dollar value of common stocks
generally moves with the price level. Jones, Case Studies of Four Companies
39-48 (1955). Therefore, if authoritative decision-makers observe a changing
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